Jus Post Bellum and the War in Afghanistan
In 2007, while in grad school, I wrote a paper about the responsibilities that a conquering or occupying power has to the conquered land, with Afghanistan as my example. Here it is.
Not surprisingly, a few things have changed since 20067. But not as many as we hoped. The below is a paper about how the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, despite technically and publicly being on the other side of official combat. That is to say, the combat mission was technically over. Unfortunately, none of the infrastructure you would expect to see from a conquered state reconstructed in the image of an advanced, industrialized democracy was there. In 2021, any infrastructure left behind has already been picked apart by the Taliban, who now rule the country again.
I feel like I could write the same paper again today. Only the conclusion would be that much more grim.
Last revised in December of 2007 - I have tried to fix all the copy-paste errors, but some may remain. I could only find my .pdf version, so it was a pain to copy.
Jus Post Bellum and the Conflict in Afghanistan: Rights Vindication in Focus
Abstract:
In this paper, I apply the principles of just war theory to the on-going NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. Given that, as of the ratification of the Bonn Agreement in December of 2001, Afghanistan is officially a post-war conflict zone, I examine the progress of rehabilitation, reconstruction and rights vindication in that country through the lens of jus post bellum. The first section of the paper delineates the limits of postwar conflict engagement and expands on the moral obligations of the conquering power to restore human rights and engage in meaningful rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The second section highlights the historical backdrop to the current conflict in Afghanistan, arguing that a Western misunderstanding of the nature of political conflict in that country has led to an over-emphasis on security and an underemphasis on rights vindication and reconstruction. In the third section of the paper, I argue that while there is some progress, this progress is largely superficial. The over-emphasis on security has resulted in large allocations of international aid resources towards war-making measures, depriving Afghans of the rights vindication and reconstruction efforts that they are morally entitled to receive from NATO. Finally, I conclude that while there have been some minimal successes in Afghanistan, there are glaring holes in nearly all components of the jus post bellum recipe, and as a result, the current NATO led mission cannot be said to be meeting its moral obligations.
In recent years, I have paid a lot of attention to the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan. A country long subject to colonialism and foreign rule, Afghanistan has pierced western consciousness by being the battleground on which the United States began her fight against terrorism, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. Originally attacked on October 7, 2001 for her role in harbouring Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist group, the group believed to be the perpetrators of 9/11, the conflict developed into a UN sanctioned, NATO led offensive. Once the Taliban, a strict fundamentalist Islamic sect, had been purged from power, the Bonn Agreement was ratified on 5 December 2001, ending the official offensive and setting the stage for a western-styled constitutional democracy to be established in the war torn region. It is with these facts in mind that I intend to argue that current reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Afghanistan on the part of NATO and her Allies do not satisfy the conditions of jus post bellum, especially in light of the historical reality of an on-going 24-year conflict and the unique character of the regionalized ethnocultural political realities within that country.
I. A Commitment to Jus Post Bellum
It is not in the scope of this paper to deal with the intricacies of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, though some familiarity with these positions will be assumed. Historically speaking, the literature pays the most attention to these two areas of Just War Theory, while jus post bellum has only recently begun to receive some attention from just war theorists. From the outset, just war theorists have recognized the interconnectedness of the conditions that set up a just war and the conditions in which war making can be considered just. The same kind of interconnectedness is going to characterize the post war situation. There must be the recognition that a just post-war situation is only possible given jus ad bellum (Orend 2006; Bass 2004). The stipulation of the interconnectedness of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum ensures a coherence within the conception of justice employed, and acts as an incentive to encourage the country that is warring in the name of justice to meet the conditions set forth in jus ad bellum. Should the conditions for jus ad bellum not be met and a war does ensue, there still remains a responsibility for the ‘saving’ country to ensure that the post-war situation has some kind of resolution that can be evaluated, whether the resulting scenario is an improvement on the old or not. Even in an unjust post war situation, it remains the responsibility of the conquering nation to leave the invaded country in good condition. Thus, the conception of a jus post bellum being intrinsically connected to jus ad bellum acts as an incentive to enter into a war only as a last resort, as the responsibilities and requirements imposed by this ‘pottery barn rule’ will likely prove to be too costly if jus ad bellum is not met.
While the conditions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello will not be discussed in detail1, it is important to note that many of the conditions that characterize these situations are also necessary in order to achieve jus post bellum. These include proportionality and publicity in demands made of the defeated nation, and the right intentions in making these demands. As with proportionality in war, the goal of the victorious nation should be to use as little force and to inflict as little suffering as is possible (Coates, 1997). The use of force in the post war situation must not be gratuitous or excessive. This eliminates the exacting of revenge upon the defeated nation. Not only would revenge serve to de-legitimize any further reparations or reconstruction that the conquering power may be morally required to contribute, but also it would require of the conquering nation excessive and unnecessary use of force. When a nation has been defeated, there is no reason for the victor to keep fighting.
Exacting revenge upon the aggressor also counteracts rights vindication, which makes up a key cornerstone in the jus post bellum situation. The fact that there were serious human rights violations constituted one of the primary conditions for jus ad bellum, and presumably acted as a primary reason jus ad bellum for carrying out the war in the first place. It only makes sense, then, to return to the people of that country the unimpeded enjoyment of a stock set of basic human rights [security, subsistence, liberty, equality and recognition]. Rights vindication, at its most basic level stipulates that once rights have been vindicated, the fighting stops. In much the same way as proportionality of fighting dictates that when a nation has been defeated the victorious nation lays down their weapons, so it is in the case of rights vindication. There must also be a commitment to punish those who deserve to be punished. Commitment to proportionality and right intention is key in these situations, as well as the ability to discriminate between the leaders of a rights-violating regime, the soldiers, on both sides, who commit war crimes during the course of battle and the civilian population within the offending state. This can work itself out in legal tribunals, but also in the demand of some sort of compensation from the defeated regime. The important thing is that those most responsible for the offense be the ones who receive the brunt of the punishment (Orend 2000). In order to foster the proper political and societal climate to satisfy rights vindication, and in order to avoid punishing those with very little responsibility, taxing the civilians (the true victims) is impermissible (Orend 2006).
The final condition is that of rehabilitation. The successful transformation of a society to one that respects basic human rights in public and private life will ultimately be the mark by which a just post war situation will be judged. This involves reconstruction of the society in a manner consistent with the condition of proportionality (Orend 2006; Bass 2004). This is going to include significant amounts of reconstruction, not only of infrastructure but also of political institutions. The condition of rehabilitation is the condition that receives the most discussion with regards to the current conflict in Afghanistan, and will thus receive the most attention in this paper. However, it must be understood that of the above conditions, rights-vindication forms the cornerstone of jus post bellum and it is within that context that I will explore the rehabilitation of post war Afghanistan. In Bass‟ paper Jus post bellum he argues against reconstruction of a defeated nation for cultural reasons. His basic view is that military victory does not mean anything in terms of demonstrating superior political or cultural values. He fears a descent into imperialism and visions of cultural superiority, and makes an exception only in cases of genocide. What then does the rehabilitation condition entail, given the condition of rights-vindication? There are a number of important points to mention, the first of which is that there ought to be significant international co-operation in the rehabilitation process (Walzer, Iasiello) in order to ensure that the interests of the victorious nation are not the ones served but that the goal remains one of human rights vindication for the citizens of the country whose regime has been replaced. It could be argued from the success of the relatively unilateral (American) rehabilitation of Germany and Japan after WWII that international co-operation is not necessary. While these situations stand out as evidence that one could successfully reconstruct a defeated nation unilaterally, it seems, at the very least, prudent to include significant international co-operation.
Gary Bass argues that rehabilitation of a defeated society should not happen out of respect for the cultural values of that society. His basic view is that military victory does not mean anything in terms of demonstrating superior political or cultural values. He fears a descent into imperialism and visions of cultural superiority, and makes an exception only in cases of genocide. One way to ensure that these fears do not come to fruition is to ensure broad international support for the rehabilitation mission in the defeated state. With the understanding that rights vindication is at the center of the rehabilitation process, coupled with the desire to avoid cultural or nationalistic imperialism, international co-operation becomes very important.2 Not only does international co-operation ensure that one particular culture or state does not determine the future of the reconstructed state, but it would also ensure that rehabilitation projects serve the needs of civilians within the defeated nation. Walzer argues that the distribution of reconstruction contracts can and often is politically motivated - one way to ensure that contracts are awarded in a way that ensures the rights vindication is the establishment of an international agency to oversee these contracts (Walzer 2004). While Walzer‟s argument was made with direct reference to the War in Iraq, which arguably fails to meet the conditions of jus ad bellum and thus cannot meet the conditions of jus post bellum, his argument that an internationally sanctioned cooperative rehabilitation effort would prevent the politicization of the reconstruction process and would aid in the establishment of a state complete with the rights to self-determination, popular political legitimacy and civil rights is very compelling. There must also be a commitment to prosecuting war criminals on both sides. This is in accordance with the punishment condition, and serves to show the victims of human rights abuses that there is a will on the part of the victorious state to bring those responsible for human rights abuses to account for their actions.
There must be an establishment of security throughout the country and the disarming of those abusers who have weapons. (Suhrke, Orend 2006, Patterson 2005) However, while it is important to recognize the importance of security, it is equally important to recognize that too much security can be parasitic on the development of human liberty, one of the basic human rights that must be respected.
Fernando Teson (2006) argues that a “security measure is justified if and only if the amount of freedom it restricts is necessary to preserve the total system of freedom threatened by internal or external enemies.” While the context in which he places his argument has to do with the extent to which the United States government may be permitted to restrict liberties in a post-9/11 America, it makes sense to extend this argument to the post-war situation. With rights vindication as a goal, the return of individual liberty is paramount, and the level of established security within the post war situation must reflect this. The fragile nature of the return of liberties, and the simple fact that the victorious nation was in fact militarily victorious suggests that extra care needs to be taken to ensure that there is genuine rights vindication and not merely vindication in name only.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction also entails connecting with locals and asking their input in terms of reconstructing a society that is beneficial to their cultural nuances while maintaining the importance of human rights vindication. This will start by coming up with a popular constitution that appeals to the values of human rights as well as to the cultural and religious heritage of that nation, a constitution that will work for the benefit of that country and not the benefit of the conquering nation. Another key task would be purging the old education system from its propaganda and developing a new curriculum that promotes respect for human rights while being sensitive to the culture of the defeated nation. As argued above, international co-operation is key, such that imperialist or profit-making concerns do not become motivations for the conquering country or the conquered.
It is also important that civil society be allowed to flourish. By civil society I mean non-state run organizations such as sports leagues, clubs, religious organizations, and music societies. It is often the case that these types of societies are stamped out by an oppressive regime because they tend to be the voice of those who oppose the ruler of that regime. The establishment of these organizations would promote diversity and respect for each other and would serve as a mode of checks and balances by indirectly limiting the power of the state (Orend 2006). When setting out rules for punishment, economic sanctions that hurt the citizens should be avoided (Orend 2006). Taking money from the economy does nothing to reconstruct a society, but only imposes undue burden upon the conquered. By investing money into the economy, helping to create jobs for locals and providing the resources necessary for a minimally just society, the conquering nation makes significant steps towards the self-sufficiency of that nation. Economic investment should not be in the form of tied-aid3 but should rather seek to include and provide employment for locals whose jobs have been destroyed by war or those who never had jobs in the first place. Economic reconstruction is just as important as the reconstruction of infrastructure, and the decisions of the conquering nations in the distribution of contracts, the avenues by which food aid is distributed, and the development of a local economy ought to reflect this reality.
It is important that the rehabilitation project ensure that the benefits of the society will be accessible to a wide margin of people. If human rights are to be respected, they are to be respected universally, across all sections of that society. The benefits of enjoying these rights must be felt by those on the ground, not merely by those holding important political or societal positions. One of the most popularly discussed entailments of the rehabilitation procedure is the commitment to an exit-strategy. Since one of the key jus ad bellum stipulations is that the point of a war is not for conquest or imperialistic reasons, it cannot appear to the people that have been freed that this was or is the goal. Likewise, with rights vindication as a jus ad bellum condition for the war, the return of rights to the local community is of paramount importance; the conquering nation ought to be there only for as long as it takes to see the return of basic human rights and a minimally just state. This requirement means having a public exit strategy; knowledge of a ‘timeline’ serves to encourage locals to take things into their own hands and reassures them of their eventual independence from the conquering power. While it is important to have an exit strategy and timeline, it is equally important to understand that the rehabilitation and reconstruction project will take time, money and there may be casualties on the part of the conquering nation. Having an exit strategy means sticking around for as long as necessary and no longer.
II. The Historical Backdrop to the Afghanistan Conflict 8
The historical backdrop to the Afghanistan conflict is important for understanding the current situation. The reality is that Afghanistan is made up of several different ethnocultural regions, with highly regionalized politics, in addition to having essentially been a war zone for the last 24 years. The political landscape of the Cold War influenced the United States to support the mujahideen against the Soviets from 1978-1989, and as the political climate shifted and the Cold War ended, along with the war with the Soviets, there was a power vacuum, allowing for the Taliban to come to power.
A country long characterized by the presence of war, wars that resulted in a tug-of-war between British colonial interests and the imperialist expansion efforts of Tsarist Russia, Afghanistan finally gained independence of its own affairs in 1919 maintaining a monarchy until 1973. However the country long ravaged by war was functionally weak. State institutions functioned, albeit barely. Government expenditures never amounted to more than 10% of the GDP; tax was never more than 6% of GDP. The country was one of the world’s weakest states before the relevant wars first began in 1978 (Rubin 2004). Made up of 6 different regionalized ethnic groups, society was less focused nationally and more focused regionally and ethnically. Afghanistan was essentially a loose conglomeration of several different people groups focused within artificially created national boundaries. In 1973 Afghanistan became a republic following a bloodless coup by the cousin of the king. By 1978, the Marxist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan had executed the president and assumed control of the country.
The country then became embroiled in a religiously motivated war with the Soviet Union, who was supporting the atheistic Marxist government forces against the Islamic mujahideen. Being that this is at the height of the Cold War, the United States had vested interest in helping the Islamic militants fight against the Soviet Union. They provided the militants with weapons and training, and when the Soviet Union pulled out in 1989 with the PDPA near shambles, the country was left with religiously motivated guerrillas trying to establish a state structure. Humanitarian aid during and after the war with the Soviets was politically motivated, with precedence to the mujahideen, over and above human rights concerns with regards to gender, drug productions, and other abuses (Barakat 2004). The war with the Soviet Union and the time immediately after saw an erosion of the rural regional society, as many were displaced from their homes, fleeing to Pakistan or otherwise joining up with the militia. The leaders of the militia gained power and wealth and became ‘warlords,’ and in the ensuing civil war (1989-1994), the rural regional character of Afghan society became one based upon loyalties to a warlord of a particular region. The emergence of the Taliban as a religious order was a reaction to the stalemate between various warlords (Barfield 2005). It was made up mostly of the dominant Afghan ethic group, the Pashtuns, and, with the help of Pakistan, was successful in capturing the capital of Kabul in 1994. It brought stability and order to the country, something that had been missing since the monarchy. Osama Bin Laden was instrumental in the establishment of the Taliban as a national stabilizing force within Afghanistan, and, although he fell out of favour with the leaders of the group, he was still revered by the now ruling Taliban. While it was a politically stabilizing force in that it brought strict control to the formerly chaotic social system and provided much needed security against the infighting against the warlords (Barakat 2004), it was inept at managing the institution of government and is best known the west for its oppressive views and blatant human rights abuses.
In October 2001, after determining that the Taliban had been aiding and abetting bin Laden, the United States attacked Afghanistan. The United States saw the fall of the Taliban primarily as punishment for aiding and abetting Osama bin Laden, and only secondarily as concern for Afghani people under an oppressive regime. The ‘war on terror’ was the war at hand and the United States feared that a more traditional peacekeeper role may divert resources from that particular war (Suhrke et al). The Taliban was defeated with relative ease - while they were able to bring a certain amount of stability to the country, they were unable to stand up against the heavy bombardment of the United States.
In recent years, the resilience of the Taliban in the southern part of the country has proved to be a significant security risk, and has required the attention of NATO troops. While the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 set the stage for free and fair elections, the insurgency has captured most of NATO‟s attention and as such, their resources. Security, broadly construed, has become the priority of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. This has caused the other elements of jus post bellum to be either ignored or put on the back burner, including, as I will argue in the next section, rights vindication.
III. Evaluating Jus Post Bellum in Afghanistan
With respect to the all important cornerstone of rights vindication, human rights have not, for the most part, been restored to the people of Afghanistan. With the former mujahideen/warlords making up a large component of a ‘fair and free’ elected parliament, human rights abuses with respect to gender, economic equality, violence, and the use of the rural people as essential slaves to the drug production have returned to the previous levels seen under the war lords during the civil war. Especially noticeable is the condition of women, which has improved, but on an extremely minimal scale. Of the 250 million dollars in aid money being channeled through the Canadian International Development Agency, only 3% of that is earmarked for programs designed to promote the rights of women. In a round table discussion I attended on January 26, 2007 at Wilfrid Laurier University, Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims argued that the focus on big western-style reconstruction projects has left rights vindication in disarray, especially as it relates to the rights of women. Even though women are allowed to be elected and participate in democracy, they are often required to have bodyguards, and face constant death threats from other members of the elected parliament, merely because they are women. In one highly publicized case, Malalai Joya, a member of parliament was physically attacked on May 7, 2006 as she rose to speak up for the rights of women in Afghanistan. She was called a ‘prostitute’ and amid snickers, it was suggested that she would be raped. Rather than take action, the President of Afghanistan, promotes these men, the powerful warlords and drug lords to higher positions of power. (Barakat & Wardell 2004; Joya 2006) (INTERJECTION, 2021 - Malalai Joya speaks out after Kabul falls to the Taliban)
On the face of it, there appears to be wide scale international co-operation through NATO and U.N. led security missions. However, when it comes to economic investment into the Afghan economy and the accessibility of the rights gained by the presence of these international organizations, the international community is failing miserably. Tied-aid with respect to the rehabilitation / reconstruction project is still the preferred method of economic investment, not only in Canada but in other countries in the coalition as well. This method of aid involves tied aid credits, which are “official or officially supported Loans, credits or Associated Financing packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all developing countries (or Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)/New Independent States (NIS) in transition)” (OECD, 2003). This limits the government of Afghanistan to supporting and investing in reconstruction projects that will be beneficial to the donor country and her allies. This often results in lucrative reconstruction contracts going to Canadian and American corporations, investment in natural resources that will be economically beneficial to Canada, and excessively restrictive rules in terms of what economic sectors merit investment, rules which shift the benefit of investment into the hands of the donor countries. As several economists have argued in recent years (Abbott and McCarthy, 1982; Chao and Yu, 2001), this often results in the recipient country being left with less than when the funds were first offered. The indirect effect of tied-aid programmes is that the total welfare of the recipient state is diminished, even if there is an increase in total capital and a decrease in the costs of that capital (Chao and Yu, 2001). When a donor country gives its aid and invests it in the economic success of the recipient country, rather than insisting that the donor country reap the economic rewards, the recipient country has a grater chance of achieving economic freedom. If Canada’s aid was not in the form of tied-aid, but rather was used to employ everyday Afghani citizens in the process of rebuilding their country, not only is economic investment in the future of Afghan infrastructure guaranteed, but so is investment in the overall welfare of the people of that nation. Creating jobs and paying locals fairly ensures that they do not return to the warlords who employ them at below cost to cultivate and work the growing opium trade. The failure of the international community to invest in the Afghan economy and infrastructure by creating jobs and opportunities for Afghans to own their own reconstruction efforts, rather than rigging the aid in such a way as it benefits themselves constitutes an indirect economic sanction, and thus does not meet the standards set forth by jus post bellum.
In terms of Canada’s contribution to the conflict, 10% of ‘aid’ goes towards reconstruction; the rest goes towards ‘security’ and other war-making resources. It helps to remember that too much security is bad for human rights vindication (Teson, 2006). As I argued earlier, the return of liberties to the civilian population is important, and the amount of security must reflect the return of these liberties. With such a significant portion of Canada’s pledged aid support going towards their war machine as opposed to the economic investment, rights vindication, the creation of a civil society, and the accessibility of rights and freedoms to a wide margin of Afghani’s, some wonder if that is rights vindication and the reconstruction of Afghanistan is the goal at all. Now some have argued, and rightfully so, that there is a certain level of security that is necessary to create a situation in which reconstruction and rehabilitation is possible. There is something to be said for that argument - indeed it serves no purpose to build a road only to have it blown up the minute the asphalt is dry. However, I argue that there are too little resources going to reconstruction and too many going to security. Here is my argument:4
Some minimum level of security is necessary to provide human rights vindication in a conquered nation.
This necessary level of security has not been reached in the southeast sections of Afghanistan, in the provinces of Lashkar, Kandahar, Tirin Kot, Kost, Jalalabad, and Kunar, which comprise a significant minority of the country. (The Economist, Feb 24, 2007; BBC News, April 10, 2007).
The appropriate level of security has been reached in the majority of the country, including the capital of Kabul and surrounding areas to the north and west.
Aid resources (including what has been allocated for security purposes) are finite.
Rights vindication means more than just eliminating the oppressive regime and securing the area.
Given 1-3, and in order to account for 4 and 5, resources must be allocated both for security and for reconstruction in the proper proportion to each other.
With only 10% of Canadian aid earmarked explicitly for reconstruction and rehabilitation purposes, there does not exist a properly proportionate amount5 of aid for those purposes.
Due to the finite nature of aid resources, it is imperative that the conquering state does not make use of all of its resources to shore up security. As I have argued throughout this paper, the goal of reconstruction and rehabilitation jus post bellum is that of rights vindication. The stock set of human rights for which the war was fought must be returned to the people of that nation, and these must be considered when allocating aid funds. In Afghanistan, a disproportionate amount of Canadian funding is going to war-making measures in the south of the country, while some of the smaller members of the coalition are left picking up the tab for reconstruction in the north. Given that security tends to be more expensive than reconstruction, it is not surprising that a greater amount of resources is earmarked for that. However, should all the resources be used up, with a significantly greater amount of it going towards security issues in a small, volatile section of the country, Canada would have failed in the greater project of the restoration of rights vindication - the sections of the nation that were secure will have failed to receive the appropriate economic investment necessary to reconstruct a social, economic and technological infrastructure that allows human rights to flourish. Ultimately the vindication of human rights is more than merely beating back rights abusers - rights vindication requires that the conquering state take an active role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of that society such that it is left in a better condition (e.g. a human rights respecting society) than when the violence began.
With respect to the commitment to prosecute and punish war criminals in the name of rights vindication, liberties are being stifled by the regionalized dictatorships of the war lords. While it is not fair to classify current conflict as a civil war in the same manner that it was between 1989-1994, the highly regionalized ethnocultural landscape, combined with the return of the war lords, this time to power sanctioned by the west (not entirely unlike the manner in which they came to power after the war with the Soviet Union) has seen, at best, a slight improvement in human liberties over the rule of the Taliban. What makes this slight improvement lauded by the west is that the Taliban was so bad that anything other than the Taliban is better - even when what is better continues to stifle the human right of liberty.
When it comes to connecting with locals and asking for their input in the development of a rights respecting society, there seems to be a disconnect between the nation building programme of the NATO-led coalition and the citizens of Afghanistan. The democratic-reconstruction programme that is currently on-going does not accord well with the regionalized ethnocultural roots of the country. The parties involved in government would have to reach an agreement on a Western-style, centralized, multi-ethnic, secular democratic system, with the acceptance of a large number of international security forces to ensure order, and the international restructuring of the country‟s economy. This model is being imposed on reluctant tribal leaders, warlords, religious authorities (most of whom are not as radical as the Taliban), and ordinary Afghans. A January 2002 briefing by Ottaway and Lieven predicted that this would result in conflict between local groups and international forces - indeed, towards the end of 2006 and in early 2007, this has been the case. Geoffrey Hayes, a Canadian military historian, suggests that Canada underestimated the power of the insurgency when it made its commitments to the Afghanistan mission. The Canadian military planners underestimated the ease with which western style democracy could be imported into the situation in Afghanistan, resulting in increased casualties and a sense of ‘taking one for the team’. In NATO’s haste to return to Afghanistan a human rights respecting society, the NATO team has neglected to properly canvass and include average Afghanis in the political process. While respect for human rights is a central component of the reconstruction programme, the peddling of a westernized style of democracy that ignores the complex ethnocultural relationships of the Afghan people seems to go against this component of reconstruction.
It can be argued that in Afghanistan, the with respect to rights vindication for the broader society, the mission has failed (Joya 2006). The successes reported in the western media are successes that concern a small minority of people. Five years later, the nation is still the fourth poorest in the world, with an 80% illiteracy rate, nearly 70% of school age women are not enrolled in school, and the men and women of Afghanistan are consistently being drawn into illegal opium production for their now elected warlords, merely for survival sake.
There is no current exit strategy for the NATO Mission in Afghanistan. NATO has recently secured more troops for Afghanistan (as of the NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia on Nov 28, 2006), with no public plans for their removal. There is an understanding that this process will take awhile, and though Canada is committed through February 2009, NATO has not made public the overall goals or plans of the mission in Afghanistan. Canadian commitment is even suspect; much was made in the House of Commons on January 29 and 30, 2007 about a military document obtained by the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party that indicates a military plan through 2011. When pressed, then Canadian Defense Minister Gordon O‟Connor would only say that Canada is committed until the end of 2009; he refuses to repudiate reports that Canadian forces are planning for a longer military mission (39th Parliament, 1st Session, Edited Hansard no. 098). It was confirmed in an October 2007 Speech From The Throne, opening up the Canadian Parliament, that the Canadian government does indeed plan on expanding its military operations in Afghanistan until 2011. The U.S. goal upon attacking Afghanistan was to find Osama Bin Laden and punish an oppressive regime that aided and abetted him. They failed on the first account but succeeded in removing the Taliban from power, however it was and remains unclear just what they planned to do once they completed their objectives. To be fair, the situation in Iraq has caused them much more grief and that is where western eyes (and the bulk of American resources) have turned. That said, it does not excuse the United States from taking responsibility for their actions in Afghanistan, and contributing significantly to the peace building process, complete with an exit-strategy.
Some may argue that an announced exit date may be harmful to the stabilization of the region. In particular, the insurgency may simply lay down their weapons for a time, and then once the exit date has come and gone and the conquering nation has left, they can come out and wreck havoc on the new infrastructure, destabilize the newly elected government, and force the country to return to the old ways, complete with human rights abuses. While I appreciate the force of this argument, it does not eliminate a public exit strategy, but only tackles the problems associated with a hard and fast exit date. In section I, I laid out the importance of an exit strategy to ensure the locals of their eventual independence from possible colonial rule. In order to procure the participation and blessing of Afghanis in the establishment of a democratic, rights-respecting society (a ‘win the hearts and minds’ approach), they must be fully aware of the fact that none of the conquering nations intend to stay in Afghanistan. Given the context of perpetual conflict in Afghanistan since 1978, it is imperative that they recognize that the NATO led mission has, as its end goal (consistent with the aims of jus post bellum), rights vindication, including the right to national independence and autonomy from foreign rule. If there existed a public 16
exit strategy that did not include a specific date, I would not be so critical of Canada‟s involvement or the NATO mission (at least not on this plank of jus post bellum). However, NATO has provided no benchmark of minimum rights vindication, nor has it provided a standard of infrastructure development (whether economic, political, social or cultural) that it would like to see achieved before it considers the mission accomplished. This, along with the cognitive dissonance involved in the Canadian government‟s insistence that Canada is committed only through the end of 2009 when plans exist through 2011 (confirmed to be true in the fall of 2007) only serves to strengthen my criticism of the failure of Canada in achieving jus post bellum in Afghanistan based on a lack of an exit strategy. I have argued the current reality of the Afghanistan conflict is in part due to the west‟s misunderstanding of the regionalized enthnocultural political realities in that country. Human rights vindication is something that ought to transcend the framework of western political liberalism; as it relates to Just War Theory, rights vindication is a central feature of its justification, whether ad bellum, in bello or post bellum. The problems facing the post war situation in Afghanistan loom large and, along with Barakat, I would urge the reader to consider the importance of these ethnocultural political realities when considering how the west can contribute to just post bellum in Afghanistan:
“[In Afghanistan] it should not be assumed that there exists a national consensus concerning a vision for the nation’s future reconstruction and development priorities… there has been no neutral space for debate to enable such a vision to emerge, or for intellectuals and development professionals to gather, to think, to discuss and to plan. The danger of the “Bonn quick fix” is that it may have helped to encourage the perception that such a vision exists, alongside a coherent administrative system.” (Barakat, 11)
Is there a just post-war situation in Afghanistan? On the face of it, it looks like there is. An international commitment to security in the nation, free and fair democratic elections, more freedoms for those oppressed under the rule of the Taliban, and a rise in international aid have all contributed to the appearance of a just post-war situation. However it has been 5 years since the Taliban has been toppled and there are still glaring holes in the reconstruction project in nearly all components of the jus post bellum recipe. It is understood that rebuilding a society takes time - however the west’s complete lack of respect for the complex regionalized ethnocultural political landscape in Afghanistan, combined with the presence of human rights abusers, drug lords and war lords in powerful governmental positions, and a lack of commitment towards international economic investment in the people of Afghanistan on a widely accessible scale suggests to me that while the post-war situation has slightly improved, it cannot be considered to have satisfied the conditions of jus post bellum.
US forces watch the Evacuation of Kabul from an MRAP Gunner Turret
Bibliography
Abbot, Philip C.; F. Desmond McCarthy. Welfare Effects of Tied Food Aid. Journal of Development Economics (Aug 1982) vol. 11 no. 1, 63-79. Barakat, Sultan.
Setting the Scene for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction, in Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan ed. Sultan Barakat (New York, NY: Palgrave-McMillan, 2004) 1-17.
________, Wardell, Gareth. Exploited by Whom? An Alternative Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghan Women, in Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan ed. Sultan Barakat (New York, NY: Palgrave-McMillan, 2004) 109-130.
Barfield, Thomas. First Steps: The Afghan Elections. Current History March 2005, 125-130.
Bass, Gary. Jus Post Bellum. Philosophy and Public Affairs (2004) vol 32 no 4 384-412.
Consolatore, Daniel. The Pashtun Factor. The Humanist (May-June 2005) vol 66 10-13.
Chao, Chi-Chur; Eden S.H. Yu. Import Quotas, Tied Aid, Capital Accumulation and Welfare. Canadian Journal of Economics (2001) vol 34, no. 3, 661-676.
Drumbl, Mark. Self-Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules or Both? International Studies Perspectives (2003) vol 4, 409-431.
Himes, Kenneth. Intervention, Just War and U.S. National Security. Theological Studies (2004) vol 64, 141-157.
Iasello, Louis V. Jus Post Bellum. Naval War College Review (2004) vol 57 no3/4.
Joya, Malalai (Former Member of the Afghan National Assembly) Address to the 22nd Convention of Canada’s New Democratic Party. September 9, 2006. Accessed at http://www.ndp.ca/node/4329 Nov 30, 2006.
Orend, Brian. Human Rights: Concept and Context. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002).
__________. The Morality of War. (Chap 6-7 given to me in .doc form by the author).
__________. War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2000).
Ottaway, Marina; Anatol Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan. Current History (March 2002) 133- 138. Parliament of Canada, Edited Hansard, no. 098, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, January 29, 2007. Available at 19 (http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39& Ses=1&DocId=2640617#TOC-TS-1445) accessed April 10, 2007.
Patterson, Eric. Just War in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Just War Theory after September 11. International Politics (2005) vol 42 116-134.
Rubin, Barnett R. (Re)Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy. Current History (April 2004) 165-170.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1977). _____________. Just and Unjust Occupations. Dissent vol 51 no 1. 61-63.
Wilson, Richard Ashby, ed. Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
For detailed discussions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, see Walzer 1977; Orend 2000; Coates 1997
Some argue that human rights theory is inherently imperialistic in nature. These arguments tend to come from nations or sections of the population that are among the most notorious abusers of human rights (Orend 2002). It is important to note that the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) is of relevance to the conflict in Afghanistan as much of the ethnocultural differences and non-western ideals are highlighted by a commitment to the Islamic religion. The promotion of human rights is not in opposition to Islam - indeed this serves as yet another argument for the inclusion of Islamic states in an international partnership that would see human rights returned to the people of Afghanistan. By including Islamic states who have signed on to this declaration of human rights, NATO is able to ward off attacks of human rights imperialism in Afghanistan.
See p. 11 for a detailed discussion of tied-aid in the context of the Afghanistan mission
I am indebted to the many discussions I enjoyed with Nicholas Businger for the structure and flavour of this argument.
Discussions of ‘a properly proportionate amount’ can be contentious, especially as there can be overlap between what is denoted as security and what is denoted and reconstruction and rehabilitation. While it is not my desire to oversimply the issues, this formulation helps to draw out the fact that 90% of aid money is earmarked specifically for security and 10% for aid purposes; the dichotomy between security and aid exists in the governmental allocation of resources. I defer the complicated issues surrounding the extent to which these two are intertwined to economists and policy makers.